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Civil Procedure-Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital- Discovery
of a Nontestifying Expert
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1970 to in-
clude a separate provision for the pretrial discovery of experts,' the federal
district courts have ruled several times on the discoverability of a nontestifying
expert's identity under rule 26(b)(4)(B). 2 It was not until Ager v. Jane C.
Stormont Hospital,3 however, that a court of appeals reviewed this issue. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in rejecting the rationale
advanced by a majority of district courts that had considered the issue,4 held
that the discovering party must show exceptional circumstances to justify dis-
closure of the identity and field of expertise of a nontestifying, specially em-
ployed or retained expert, or of any other collateral information relating to
that expert.5
InAger plaintiff, through her father, brought a malpractice action against
defendants Stormont-Vail Hospital and Dr. Dan Tappen for injuries sustained
at birth.6 Subsequently, Dr. Tappen drafted a series of interrogatories, three
of which essentially asked plaintiff to reveal the names and addresses of all
experts who were contacted in preparation for the malpractice action.7 The
magistrate ordered plaintiff to answer the interrogatories unless the experts
were only informally consulted, rather than specially employed or retained.
Plaintiff refused to provide the identity of the consultative experts who were
not expected to testify, apparently on the ground that an expert who is unable
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) states:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule
35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
means.
For a general survey of the new rule, see Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. Ill. L.F. 895 [here-
inafter cited as Graham, Part One].
2. See notes 43-59 and accompanying text infra.
3. 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. See notes 50-59 and accompanying text infra.
5. 622 F.2d at 503.
6. During Emily Ager's birth, her mother suffered a massive rupture of the uterine wall,
resulting in Mrs. Ager's death. Also, the placenta prematurely separated from the uterine wall,
resulting in fetal asphyxia. As a consequence, Emily suffered severe neurological dysfunction and
now is a mentally impaired quadraplegic with no control over her bodily functions. Id. at 498.
7. The specific interrogatories at issue were:
1. Have you contacted any person or persons, whether they are going to testify or not,
in regard to the care and treatment rendered by Dr. Dan Tappen involved herein?
2. If the answer to the question immediately above is in the affirmative, please set forth
the name of said person or persons and their present residential and/or business
address.
3. If the answer to question #1 is in the affirmative, do you have any statements or
written reports from said person or persons?
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to aid the party and will not testify falls within the definition of an informally
consulted expert. The magistrate rejected plaintiff's view that the classification
of an expert as retained or specially employed was determined by the value of
the expert's opinion and ruled that if a medical expert "is paid or makes a
charge for such service, he has been 'retained' or 'specially employed' within
the meaning of the Rule."8 Plaintiff, therefore, was required to answer the
interrogatories. Rather than respond, plaintiff sought review, but the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas affirmed the magistrate's order.
Plaintiff again refused to reveal the identity of her consultative experts, and a
civil contempt order was entered against plaintiff's attorney, who had agreed
to accept all sanctions.
On appeal, plaintiff challenged the contempt power of the district court9
and raised two discovery issues. The first involved the proper means, for dis-
covery purposes, of distinguishing between an expert who was retained or spe-
cially employed in anticipation of litigation and one who was only informally
consulted.' 0 The second raised the question of proper criteria to be used in
determining discoverability of an expert found to have been specially em-
ployed or retained.'1
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguishes be-
tween experts who will testify at trial and those who will not. 12 Subsection (A)
provides for-the discovery, through interrogatories, of the names of experts
who will testify at trial and the subject matter of their testimony. 13 Subsection
(B), however, permits discovery of nontestifying experts only if they were spe-
cially employed or retained, and even then discovery is allowed only under
special circumstances.1 4 Because no reference was made to informally con-
sulted experts in rule 26(b)(4), the Advisory Committee maintained that dis-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 499-500. The court held the civil contempt order to be dependent on the validity of
the underlying order. Id. at 500. Plaintiff's attorney, therefore, would be held in contempt only if
the court affimed the trial court's ruling on the discovery issues.
10. See notes 15-24 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 28-63 and accompanying text infra.
12. This distinction was the subject of much debate when first proposed. One commentator
stated:
In setting a higher standard for discovery of materials prepared by experts who are
not prospective witnesses, the Proposed Rule implicitly recognizes that fear of discovery
may deter thorough preparation in cases where an expert's work is not indispensable.
Litigants may refrain from hiring experts when the threat of discovery is great. How-
ever, when an expert's work is indispensable-when the expert will be called as a wit-
ness-the danger of surprise and the possible introduction of new issues justify the
abandonment of high standards for discovery, especially since the threat of disclosure of
information favorable enough to be used at trial probably will not deter preparation of a
case.
Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 271, 282
(1968). But see Note, Civil Procedure-Discovery of Expert Information, 47 N.C.L. Rev. 401,406
(1969): "The first party to reach and 'buy' an expert, because of the stringent showing required for
discovery of non-testifying experts, would be able to suppress unfavorable findings of that expert
simply by declining to offer his testimony at trial."
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
14. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
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covery of informally consulted experts is unavailable.' 5 All courts that have
considered the question have recognized this prohibition as it relates to the
discovery of expert identity and opinions, 16 although some courts have as-
serted, in dicta, that in extreme circumstances even discovery of informally
consulted experts may be permitted.' 7 Unfortunately, the Advisory Commit-
tee did not define "informally consulted," and the Ager court had to distin-
guish between the two classes of experts.
Several different tests for distinguishing between informally consulted
and specially retained experts were discussed inAger. Plaintiff argued that an
expert was informally consulted and excluded from discovery if the consulting
party considered the expert to be of no assistance.18 Using a different ap-
proach, the Ager trial court relied on the formality of the consultation, placing
emphasis on the payment of a fee and a scheduled appointment.' 9 The court
of appeals, believing that the trial court's test was too rigid, took a third view
and held that an expert's status must be determined on an ad hoc basis.20
Among the factors the court of appeals considered relevant were:
(1) the manner in which the consultation was initiated; (2) the nature,
type and extent of information or material provided to, or deter-
mined by, the expert in connection with his review; (3) the duration
and intensity of the consultative relationship; and (4) the terms of the
consultation, if any (e.g. payment, confidentiality of test data or opin-
ions, etc.). Of course, additional factors bearing on this determina-
tion may be examined if relevant.21
In many cases the Ager test yields the same result as the no-assistance test
suggested by plaintiff.22 After a preliminary meeting, the consulting party
15. Id. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes. See also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2033 (1970). The Committee probably made this distinction because informally
consulted experts are more likely to cooperate with the adverse party than are those who have
been specially employed. Graham, Part One, supra note 1, at 938 n.172.
16. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Wei-
ner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Bald v. B.F. Diamond Constr.
Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976); Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
17. See, e.g., Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Discovery should be allowed in
some unusual circumstances. For example, if as a result of destructive testing the expert is the
only one with knowledge of the facts, then the "exceptional circumstances" test should override
the "informally consulted" test. "This approach would neither discourage a party from searching
for expert witnesses, nor would it deprive a party of discovery from an expert who had not been of
assistance to the adversary when exceptional circumstances have been shown." Graham, Part
One, supra note I, at 940.
18. 622 F.2d at 501. Professor Graham states that "[a] consulting party may consider the
expert of no assistance because of his insufficient credentials, his unattractive demeanor, or his
excessive fees." Graham,,Part One, supra note 1, at 939-40 n.182.
19. 622 F.2d at 501. If an attorney met a doctor socially and they discussed the case without
a consultation charge, then it would be viewed as an informal consultation. Id. See USM Corp. v.
American Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1980) (lack of compensation a factor in determin-
ing that expert was informally consulted).
20. 622 F.2d at 501.
21. Id.
22. The strictest test of the three was that proposed by the trial court. The court of appeals
implied that, under the trial court's test, if a telephone inquiry were made in which an expert
provided general information and a fee were charged, the expert would be specially employed.
See id. at 502. While the court may have exaggerated to make its point, the trial court's test
19821
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may determine that the expert will be of no assistance because he is unfamiliar
with the theory or techniques involved, he advocates a school of thought that
is unfavorable to the party's action or he charges excessive fees. Since the
consultative relationship was of a short duration and nothing more than gen-
eral information was exchanged, a court using the Ager test would label it an
informal consultation, as would a court using the no-assistance test. A conflict
arises, according to the Ager court, when the consulting party does not dis-
cover that the expert will be of no assistance until after a working relationship
has been established.23 Perhaps the undesirable information or characteristics
are not revealed until a series of meetings have taken place or the expert has
made a preliminary analysis. While this expert may be considered informally
consulted under the no-assistance test, the Ager court believed that considera-
tion of the factors it listed would cause the expert to be labelled specially em-
ployed.2 4 If an expert finally is deemed to have been informally consulted, no
discovery may ensue. If, on the other hand, an expert is deemed specially
employed or retained, the second prong of the Ager test, under rule
26(b)(4)(B), requires a showing of exceptional circumstances before an expert
may be the subject of discovery.
The Ager court realized, however, that rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not address
affirmatively the question of discoverability of a nontestifying expert's iden-
tity. Rather,. it turned to the Advisory Committee Notes, which suggest that
discovery was available on "proper showing. ''25 The court equated this to a
showing of exceptional circumstances. 26
The requirement of showing exceptional circumstances promotes the pol-
icy of allowing a party to seek advice freely without fear that the expert will
later disclose to the opposing party information gained during consultation.27
The expert may know facts that would be detrimental if possessed by the op-
posing party. Additionally, the expert may be aware of litigation strategy. It
was imperative, therefore, for the rulemakers to fashion rule 26(b)(4)(B) to
protect the retaining party. Defendant inAger, on the other hand, argued that
discovery of an expert's identity did not violate the policies of the rule 26(b)
provisions,28 which were designed to prevent the discovering party from using
his opponent's resources, diligence and aggressive preparation to develop his
own case.29 Defendant contended that after he knew which experts plaintiff
requires little in the way of balancing. Any consultation with a semblance of formality will result
in the retention of the expert, regardless of the duration or fruitfulness of the relationship.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. "As an ancillary procedure, a party may on a proper showing require the other party to
name experts retained or specially employed, but not those informally consulted." Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
26. 622 F.2d at 503. Contra, 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032 (properly
worded interrogatory satisfies the "proper showing" requirement).
27. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 169, 194 [hereinafter cited
as Graham, Part Two].
28. 622 F.2d at 502.
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
[Vol. 60
CIVIL PROCEDURE
had retained, he would have to rely on his own diligence and resourcefulness
to contact the experts and enlist their assistance.30 This is precisely one prob-
lem that rule 26(b)(4)(B) seeks to avoid. The Ager court noted several reasons
why the discovery of an expert's identity, without an exceptional circumstance
requirement, may lead to the discovery of information and opinions that
would have been nondiscoverable under rule 26(b)(4)(B). 3 1 After discovery,
the litigant may contact the expert, who would in turn provide the litigant with
relevant facts and views on the case. Despite the apparent unfairness that such
an activity would create, the likelihood of its occurrence may be minimal. A
doctor-patient privilege or some other ethical or moral duty would probably
prevent the expert from revealing freely the product of his employment with
the retaining party. As an added precaution, one commentator has suggested
that a party who anticipates that the court is going to permit disclosure of an
expert's identity absent a showing of exceptional circumstances should draft a
contractual agreement that prohibits the expert from discussing the case with
other parties to the suit.32
The Ager court also recognized the possibility that the discovering party
may compel the expert to testify after disclosure of his identity.33 Although
the court questioned the propriety of this action,34 other federal courts have
used their subpoena powers to force experts to testify.35 Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that a party's expert will be called by the opposing party because most
litigants would fear that their adversaries' experts would be "client-oriented"
and uncooperative on the witness stand.3 6 Professor Friedenthal argues that
even if the expert is called, the retaining party can successfully maintain that
the discovering party should be required to use his own expert if the retaining
party shows that there are other, similarly competent experts available.37
Friedenthal's analysis, in effect, permits trial examination upon a showing of
30. 622 F.2d at 502-03.
31. Id. at 503.
32. Graham, Part Two, supra note 27, at 195. A finding of exceptional circumstances by the
court would, of course, supersede any such contract.
33. 622 F.2d at 503.
34. Id. at 503 n.6.
35. See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973); United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941). State courts are split on
the issue but lean toward the federal practice. Graham, Part One, supra note 1, at 935.
36. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. L.
Rev. 455, 484 (1962). See also Graham, Part One, supra note I, at 934.
37. Friedenthal, supra note 36, at 484. Even if there are experts available, in some cases it
would be appropriate to compel the expert to testify. Friedenthal asserts:
But even if the basic information is available and there are experts willing to be
employed, this does not mean that they are as informed, as capable of analyzing the
problems, or as adept at testifying at trial as is the adverse party's expert. Indeed, it may
be that out of a group of five or six capable experts in a field only one would agree with a
litigant. If he is one of two hired by the adverse party, the fact that there are three or
four others willing to be employed will not be of much assistance. If availability of other
experts were the sole criterion for prohibiting disclosure the need for expert testimony
might often result in a race between litigants to employ the most prominent expert whose
opinions obviously would carry much weight with a local jury.
Id. at 484-85.
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exceptional circumstances. Unlike discovery, however, the retaining party
must prove an absence of exceptional circumstances, rather than placing the
burden on the discovering party to prove their existence.
Furthermore, the Ager court feared that by permitting discovery without
demonstrating exceptional circumstances the discovering party may use the
information to influence unduly the jury. The court hypothesized that the dis-
covering party could ask his opponent, at trial, if he had retained any experts
who were not going to testify. By doing so, the discovering party would hope
to leave the jury with "an inference that the retaining party is attempting to
suppress adverse facts or opinions. '' 3  The court implied that such questioning
might be improper but that it may be admitted into evidence. 39 While the
possibility does exist, it appears that the relevancy of such questioning is low
and the chance of undue influence high. Thus a court would be expected to
instruct both parties that the information was irrelevant and all statements
relating to the employment of retained experts were inadmissible.40
Finally, the Ager court noted the adverse effect that unlimited discovery
would have on the number of experts willing to discuss a potential law suit. In
particular the court agreed with appellant's fear that the number of candid
opinions supplied by medical experts would decrease. 41 Because of the "wide-
spread aversion" among health-care providers to assist in malpractice actions,
the number of consultative experts is limited. Physicians may be unwilling to
provide evaluative consultations if discovery of their identities may be ob-
tained whether or not they ultimately testify. "[A]ccess to informed opinions
is desirable in both prosecuting valid claims and eliminating groundless ones
"42
There is currently a split of decisions among district courts on the neces-
sity of showing exceptional circumstances, with the court of appeal's decision
in Ager representing the minority view among the district courts. The ap-
proach taken byAger was first articulated by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co. ,43 which
held that a showing of exceptional circumstances was required to discover a
nontestifying expert's identity. The court stated that the rigorous standards
pertaining to the discovery of facts and opinions held by experts under rule
26(b)(4)(B) should be applied to disclosure of identity.44 The Perry court
38. 622 F.2d at 503.
39. See id.
40. A similar instruction was suggested by Professor Graham in regard to an expert who
previously was retained by one party but at trial was a witness for the other party. Graham, Part
Two, supra note 27, at 196.
41. 622 F.2d at 503.
42. Id. (quoting Brief of Appellant at 27-28, 29-30).
43. 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971). In Perry plaintifffireman was struck by a fire truck as he
attempted to activate a water pump manufactured and installed by defendant. Defendant re-
quested the identity of all experts who examined the truck and the pump shortly after the accident.
Id. at 279.
44. Id. at 280. The court stated that the standard under rule 26(b)(4)(B) should not be re-
laxed. Id.
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found support for this view in rule 26(e), which provides: "(1) A party is
under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any ques-
tion directly addressed to ... (B) the identity and location of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial. . . -45 The court inferred
from this provision that identity was discoverable only after an expert was
expected to testify.46
The only other federal court47 to enforce an exceptional circumstances
requirement, prior to Ager, was the United States District Court for Massa-
chusetts in Guilloz v. Falmouth HospitalAssociatlon.48 The magistrate in that
case noted that rule 26(b)(4)(B) contained no provision for disclosure of an
expert's identity and that the Advisory Committee's "proper showing" re-
quirement amounted to a showing of exceptional circumstances. To demon-
strate exceptional circumstances, the discovering party must prove that the
information is relevant and material to the litigation.49
Those courts that have rejected the analysis taken by Ager have followed
the reasoning of Professors Wright and Miller 5° and have held that no special
showing is required in order to discover the identity of an opposing party's
expert. 5 1 The leading cases articulating this view are Sea Colony, Inc. v. Conti-
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
46. 54 F.R.D. at 280. The court's reliance on rule 26(e) was unfounded. The purpose of this
provision is to supply the opposing party with an updated list of all expert witnesses so that he
may prepare for cross-examination; it does not imply that the experts were unknown to that party
prior to supplementation.
47. A state court has construed its parallel discovery provision to require a showing of excep-
tional circumstances. Trainor v. Young, 348 So. 2d 1004 (La. App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 169
(La. 1977) (defendant sought identity of doctor consulted about merits of medical malpractice suit;
held not discoverable absent exceptional circumstances).
48. 21 F.R. Serv. 2d 1367 (D. Mass. 1976).
49. Id. at 1369-71. Guiloz deserves further analysis. As a precautionary measure, plaintiffs
attorney always consulted a doctor before instituting a malpractice suit to ensure that the action
was not frivolous. Defendant asserted that the doctor was an "educating expert" whose identity
and area of expertise were discoverable under Massachusetts practice. Id. at 1368.
An educating expert, as opposed to a testifying expert, is largely immune from dis-
covery, except for his name and the subject of his knowledge and opinions. The facts he
knows and the opinions he holds are generally undiscoverable in all but the highly
unique situations. Before the immunity obtains, of course, the party seeking to establish
immunity must show that the expert was hired in anticipation of trial. At that point the
burden shifts, and the party attempting to discover the contents of the expert's mind
must demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
Id. (quoting 7 J. Smith & H. Zobel, Massachusetts Practice 214 (1974)).
Plaintiff claimed that defendant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances. The doctor
was simply a "consulting expert" who informed plaintiff that he had a colorable claim. Discovery
of his identity would not lead to any admissible evidence. Furthermore, plaintiff argued that it
was necessary to keep the identity private to avoid embarassment to the doctor. The court ac-
cepted plaintiffs argument, recognizing that, by divulging his name, the doctor's future usefulness
would be destroyed and that defendant had not asserted a corresponding benefit to be gained
through discovery. Id. at 1371.
50. See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032.
51. E.g., Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Roesburg v. Johns
Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83
F.R.D. 256 (N.D. IW. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Bald v. B.F. Diamond Con-
str. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113 (D.
Del 1974).
1982]
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nental Insurance Co.52 and Baki v. B.F Diamond Construction Co.,s3 both
United States district court cases. In Sea Colony defendant requested the
"names of all experts retained by plaintiff who were not intended to be called
at trial," but plaintiff refused to comply, claiming that the information was
work product and that defendant had made no showing of exceptional circum-
stances.54 After dismissing the work product argument,55 the court empha-
sized that the rule 26(b)(4)(B) exceptional circumstances requirement
pertained only to the impracticality of obtaining "facts or opinions." Because
rule 26(b)(4)(B) did not mention identity, exceptional circumstances were not
required in order to discover only the identity of an expert.5 6 In Baki, which
followed Sea Colony, the court noted that the general discovery provision, rule
26(b)(1), provides for the discovery of "persons having knowledge of any dis-
coverable matter."57 The court stressed that rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not mention
"identity" because the authority to obtain an expert's identity is found in rule
26(b)(1). 58 A number of cases following Baki have employed the same rea-
soning to allow discovery of a nontestifying expert's identity.5 9
Commentators also have argued that an expert's identity should be freely
discoverable. Professor Graham recognized that awareness of an expert's
identity may be helpful if he is associated with a particular school of thought
or approach to the conflict.60 By discovering his identity the discovering party
could prepare for trial accordingly. The circumstances in Sea Colony raise the
dilemma that until a party is aware of the identity of the adverse party's re-
tained experts, he may be unable to determine whether there are exceptional
circumstances, which are required under rule 26(b)(4)(B) to discover facts or
opinions of the experts.61 While these contentions have some merit, it appears
that the benefits of disclosure are outweighed by the possible abuses of unlim-
ited discovery as articulated in Ager. The rulemakers adopted a discovery
52. 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
53. 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976).
54. 63 F.R.D. at 113.
55. Id. at 114. The trial court cited the Advisory Committee, which had rejected "as ill-
considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the work-product
doctrine." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
56. 63 F.R.D. at 114.
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
58. 71 F.R.D. at 182. The party opposing discovery may avoid answering the interrogatories
if he can show that the information "is irrelevant, privileged, or for some other reason should not
be disclosed." Id.
59. See Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Roesberg v. Johns
Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83
F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Starr, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
60. Graham, Part One, supra note 1, at 934 n.148.
61. See 63 F.R.D. at 114. Cf. Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(court held plaintiff needs to discover identity of opponent's expert so that he can prepare for
cross-examination if he is called to testify and so that he can decide if he should employ his own
expert). One student commentator argues that discovery of identity should be allowed so that a
party may be aware of "the possible existence of information to which he may be entitled." Once
he discovers identity, he can then demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Comment, Discovery
of Expert Information Under the Federal Rules, 10 U. Rich. L. Rev. 706, 717 n.59 (1976).
[Vol. 60
CIVIL PR 0 CED UPE
provision that was designed to prevent a party from using his opponent's ex-
pert information to prepare for trial.62 This intent should not be
circumvented.
Rather than on preparation through discovery, emphasis should be
placed on retaining one's own qualified experts to alert a party to different
approaches on which his opponent might rely. A party should rely on his own
expert for information about possible strategies, and if the litigation involves
different theories, the expert can suggest another expert with comparable qual-
ifications to assist in trial preparation. Of course, in most cases the opposing
party must rely on expert witnesses to develop a particular approach, and the
identity of these experts and the facts and opinions on which they will testify
are discoverable through rule 26(b)(4)(A).63 An additional problem arises
when the opposing party has retained all the available experts in a given area
in an attempt to frustrate the opponent's preparation. Applying the Ager anal-
ysis, a party then could demonstrate the requisite exceptional circumstances
and discover the identities of the opposing party's experts, as well as their facts
and opinions. In the majority of cases, however, a party should be required to
rely on his own experts for instruction.
The two-pronged test for the discovery of a nonwitness expert's identity,
as presented in Ager, is firmly rooted in rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s limited discovery
provisions. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) permits discovery "upon a showing of excep-
tional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking dis-
covery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." 64
Commentators65 and courts66 have determined that this requirement was
designed to make discovery difficult. An empirical study, however, concluded
that discovery was permitted more often than would be expected under such a
stringent test.67 The significance of the Ager decision, therefore, is affected
greatly by the courts' interpretation of "exceptional circumstances." For this
decision to have the proper effect, courts must strictly construe the require-
ments for exceptional circumstances.
In Crocket v. Virginia Folding Box Co. 68 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia reasoned that in addition to "exceptional
circumstances," the discovering party must demonstrate "substantial need."
Even though information was unavailable from other experts, the court held
that a party must demonstrate sufficient need to overcome the potential for
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Comm. Notes.
63. See id. 26(b)(4)(A).
64. Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
65. See, e.g., 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032.
66. See, e.g., Hoover v. United States Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 n.13 (5th Cir.
1980) ("A party seeking disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) carries a heavy burden."); United
States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Since a litigant will not know what facts the
opposing party's experts have discovered and what opinions they have formed, it will rarely be
possible to make the required showing."). See also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 15, § 2032
nn.86-87, for a review of other cases.
67. See Graham, Part Two, supra note 27, at 192-93.
68. 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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misuse of discovered information against the retaining party.69 Discovery of
an expert's identity, as it relates to exceptional circumstances, should be no
different from discovery of facts or opinions. The special requirement is
designed to prevent unfairness in permitting the discovering party to use the
retaining party's experts to build his case. 70 The policy considerations devel-
oped in Ager dealt with the same concern7T'-the potential danger that the
information will be used by the discovering party. Nevertheless, it should not
be impossible to demonstrate exceptional circumstances; rather they should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a party is unable to locate
a competent expert who is willing to provide assistance on a subject that is
vital to his action or defense, the party should be permitted to discover,
through a properly framed interrogatory, whether the opposing party has re-
tained any experts who are qualified.72
If courts strictly construe the requirements for exceptional circumstances,
the Ager approach should add uniformity to discovery of nontestifying experts
because the standard for discovering an expert's identity differs little from the
standard for discovering his facts or opinions. The Ager court recognized that
the discovery of an expert's identity without exceptional circumstances will
allow a litigant to gather facts and opinions that otherwise would have been
unavailable. Although added precautions, such as contractual agreements, di-
minish the possibility of an abuse of discovery power, the potential still exists.
Furthermore, unlimited discovery could decrease the number of experts, espe-
cially within the medical profession, who will be willing to participate in trial
preparation and litigation that pits expert against expert. In addition to the
policy considerations, discovery of the nontestifying expert's identity must be
subject to the requirement of exceptional circumstances if the primary objec-
tive of rule 26(b)(4)(B)-the protection of the expert's facts and opinions-is
to be preserved. Thus, the.Ager analysis of the discoverability of the identity
69. Id. at 320.
70. In Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
plaintiff, a gasoline marketer, sought discovery of a nontestifying consultant for defendant, a pe-
troleum refiner. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, while recogniz-
ing that the consultant had been specially employed in anticipation of litigation, held that plaintiff
could not discover facts known and opinions held by the expert if it failed to show that it could not
acquire the information from other sources. Id. at 994.
In Dixon v. Cappellini, 88 F.R.D. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1980), the discovering party was able to
demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff, a member of the Unification Church, alleged
that she suffered extreme fright and nervous shock while she was in the custody of defendants,
who were "de-programmers." Defendants sought discovery of the reports and opinions of a psy-
chologist and a psychiatrist who were consulted by plaintiff immediately after the de-program-
ming. The court had reservations about declaring these experts as ones specially employed or
retained in anticipation of litigation but stated that if they were, the rule 26(b)(4)(B) exceptional
circumstances requirement had been met. The court noted that the plaintiff's physical and mental
condition immediately after de-programming was central to the case and that the defendants
could not obtain that information except through discovery of the plaintiff's doctors. Id. at 3.
71. See notes 31-42 and accompanying text supra.
72. Cf. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (defendant could not de-
pose plaintiff's retained expert when there was no showing that defendant was without sufficient
funds or information to obtain comparable opinions).
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of nontestifying, specially employed or retained experts is the preferable
approach.
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